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Existing research indicates the interrelated nature of different dimensions of the design of international institutions. In
particular, it shows the greater flexibility of deep agreements. We argue—and demonstrate empirically—that the positive
relationship between depth and flexibility holds for preferential trade agreements (PTAs). But we add two qualifications
to the conventional wisdom that depth and flexibility go hand in hand. First, we argue that the positive relationship
between depth and flexibility proves weaker for democracies than for nondemocracies. Second, when making deep agree-
ments more flexible, countries also add strings to the use of the additional flexibility provisions. An original data set on
the design of 587 PTAs allows us to test our arguments. Both descriptive evidence and multivariate statistics support the
theoretical expectations. The findings contribute to the literatures on the design of international institutions and the
causes and consequences of PTAs.
Existing research on the design of international institu-
tions shows that deep agreements tend to be more flexi-
ble than shallow ones are (Downs, Rocke, and Barsoom
1996; Rosendorff and Milner 2001; Kucik and Reinhardt
2008).1 We argue that this pattern also holds for prefer-
ential trade agreements (PTAs). Deep PTAs with many
commitments—such as liberalizing services trade while
protecting foreign direct investments and also intellec-
tual property rights—should also feature multiple flexi-
bility measures that allow states to temporarily withdraw
concessions. We also argue, however, for a more
nuanced relationship between depth and flexibility than
existing scholarship recognizes. In particular, the positive
relationship between depth and flexibility should be less
pronounced for democracies than it is for nondemocra-
cies. Moreover, we expect countries to attach strings to
the use of the flexibility provisions that they add to deep
agreements.
We test these expectations on a new data set on the
design of 587 PTAs signed between 1945 and 2009 (D€ur,
Baccini, and Elsig 2014). Our data set is very comprehen-
sive in terms of both agreements covered and detail of
the coding. It contains data on a substantially larger num-
ber of PTAs than existing data sets. Moreover, it includes
a large number of items that allow us to measure the
agreements’ depth and flexibility, and the extent of
restrictions on the use of flexibility tools. Bivariate and
multivariate analyses support our theoretical expectations.
The findings prove highly robust to changes in estimation
method and the operationalization of variables.
We thus report the first large-n study of the relation-
ship between depth and flexibility with respect to PTAs.
In focusing on PTAs, our study nicely complements exist-
ing literature on the design of international economic
institutions. This literature focuses mainly on the World
Trade Organization (WTO) and its forerunner, the Gen-
eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) (Rosen-
dorff and Milner 2001; Rosendorff 2005; Kucik and
Reinhardt 2008; Pelc 2009). In the GATT/WTO system,
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negotiations take place against the background of a more
or less fixed institutional structure, which in most cases
leaves only a few elements up for discussion. In negotiat-
ing a PTA, by contrast, countries make many choices
regarding institutional design at the same time. More-
over, accumulating evidence suggests that variation in
PTA design matters for key economic outcomes such as
trade flows and foreign direct investments.2 These consid-
erations point to the importance of understanding the
relationship between depth and flexibility in PTAs.
This article also contributes to the broader literature
on the design of international institutions (see Koreme-
nos, Lipson, and Snidal 2001). In particular, our study
provides good reasons to believe that the depth–flexibility
relationship is more nuanced than currently recognized
also for international institutions other than PTAs. Both
our argument about regime type and the concept of flexi-
bility strings should apply to other institutional settings.
We expand on these implications in the conclusion.
The Relationship between Depth and Flexibility in
PTAs
International agreements vary in terms of both depth of
cooperation and their flexibility. “Depth” refers to the
extent to which an agreement constrains state behavior.3
In the particular case of trade agreements, deep agree-
ments liberalize trade more than hollow agreements. An
important determinant of the depth of a trade agreement
is the average tariff cuts it requires from states. Trade
agreements, however, can also contribute to liberalizing
trade relations between states by opening some service
sectors to foreign competition or by allowing foreign
companies to bid for tenders for government procure-
ment contracts. Similarly, the protection of foreign direct
investment can substantially enhance market access for
exporters, as foreign investments can be a precondition
for trade. A trade agreement can also go beyond protect-
ing investments against arbitrary decisions and explicitly
liberalize foreign investments (World Trade Organization
2011:137–140).
Other behind-the-border obstacles that a deep trade
agreement may remove include burdensome technical
standards, discriminatory food safety and animal and
plant health measures, inadequate protection of intellec-
tual property rights, and competition rules that discrimi-
nate against foreign traders. Some PTAs, for example,
foresee the mutual recognition of international product
standards or the harmonization of technical regulations
(Piermartini and Budetta 2009). This reduces transaction
costs and increases market integration. The strengthening
of intellectual property rights also enables exporters to
pursue a long-term market penetration strategy. Absence
of patent or trademark protection directly translates into
less exports and less technology transfer in the case of
investments directed at foreign markets (Maskus and Pen-
ubarti 1995). Finally, cooperation on competition policy
addresses unfair business behavior by state enterprises
and private firms. Competition provisions thus facilitate
exports and foreign investments. The depth of a trade
agreement, therefore, is a function of tariff cuts and pro-
visions concerning services, government procurement,
investments, standards, intellectual property rights, and
competition.
Flexibility provisions are devices included in an agree-
ment that allow states to anticipate and respond to
domestic contingencies or to adjust their policies for
other purposes without violating the terms of an agree-
ment. They provide for legally accepted opt-outs without
leading to a de jure breach of an agreement and encom-
pass exit options, duration and renegotiation clauses, res-
ervations, escape clauses, and withdrawal clauses (see, for
example, Koremenos et al. 2001; Rosendorff and Milner
2001; Helfer 2005, 2013; Koremenos 2005; Neumayer
2007).
In trade agreements, we often find flexibility instru-
ments such as special and general safeguard provisions,
antidumping clauses, balance of payments (BoP) excep-
tions, and tariff overhang (namely a gap between applied
and bound tariffs). The Treaty of Rome (1957), for exam-
ple, allowed member states of the European Economic
Community to suspend part of their liberalization in the
case of BoP difficulties (Art. 109). Similarly, the EU–
South Korea PTA contains a special safeguard related to
cars (Elsig and Dupont 2012). In addition, safety valves
exist to address anticompetitive behavior by other states
(excessive use of subsidies to boost exports) or by firms
(dumping practices). These exist in the form of anti-
dumping and countervailing duty provisions.
While depth and flexibility capture two distinct dimen-
sions of institutional design, several studies have argued
and/or shown that depth and flexibility are positively
related (Rosendorff and Milner 2001; Kucik and Reinhardt
2008; Johns 2014). Two different causal pathways may
explain this relationship. For one, flexibility may facilitate
the negotiation of deeper agreements (Kucik and Rein-
hardt 2008). This argument assumes that states value the
long-term benefits of cooperation, but also face short-term
domestic pressure to violate an agreement, which varies
over time. When the pressure is strong, governments have
an incentive to violate agreements that do not contain flex-
ibility provisions (Downs et al. 1996). Violation, in turn,
may prompt retaliation, causing a breakdown of coopera-
tion. States, therefore, only negotiate deep agreements if
they can include flexibility in the agreement that ensures
the long-term viability of cooperation.
Alternatively, deep agreements may lead to greater
domestic demand for flexibility. This argument starts with
the insight that international agreements have distribu-
tional effects. In the case of trade, agreements benefit
exporters that gain from better foreign market access and
multinational companies that (plan to) invest in partner
countries. At the same time, they hurt import-competing
interests that face greater import-competition. Impor-
tantly, a trade agreement’s distributional effects depend
on its depth. Recent research shows that deeper agree-
ments have a greater positive trade flow effect than shal-
low ones (Baier and Bergstrand 2007; D€ur et al. 2014;
Egger and Nigai 2015). They also encourage more for-
eign direct investments (B€uthe and Milner 2014).
Given these distributional effects, deep agreements can
be expected to receive support from exporters and multi-
national companies. At the same time, plans for a deep
agreement should lead to particularly intensive lobbying
from import-competing groups that demand protection.
The reason is that the number of economic sectors that
potentially experience negative effects from a PTA
2 For the effect of trade agreement design on trade flows, see D€ur et al.
(2014) and Egger and Nigai (2015), and for foreign direct investments, see
B€uthe and Milner (2014).
3 This is similar to Downs et al. (1996:383) who define depth as “the
extent to which [an agreement] requires states to depart from what they
would have done in its absence.”
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increases together with the depth of an agreement. Ser-
vice providers, for example, do not have to fear foreign
competition if an agreement only liberalizes trade in
goods. Similarly, sectors protected via discriminatory tech-
nical standards do not need to bother about tariff cuts,
unless the trade agreement also includes a provision that
harmonizes technical standards. If import-competitors
cannot block an agreement, they will push for a mini-
mum objective, namely ensuring that the agreement is
highly flexible. For them, flexibility provisions soften the
impact of an agreement and serve as a form of protection
(Grossman and Helpman 1994). In the face of strong lob-
bying by import-competitors, governments can be
expected to make deep agreements flexible.
Both causal arguments thus lead to the expectation that
depth and flexibility are positively related. So far, most
studies test this relationship between depth and flexibility
for the case of trade agreements negotiated in the frame-
work of the GATT/WTO. Kucik and Reinhardt (2008),
for example, show that countries that have an antidump-
ing instrument agree to lower tariff bindings upon entry
into the GATT/WTO system (and sustain them as mem-
bers) than other countries. In PTAs, we expect the causal
mechanism to work in the other direction. PTA negotia-
tors tend to resolve the question of depth first and only
then decide on the amount of flexibility included in the
agreement. In fact, as soon as countries signal their inten-
tion to negotiate a PTA, they specify how ambitious the
future agreement should be, long before they negotiate
specific flexibility provisions. The causal link thus most
probably goes from depth to flexibility. As in the empiri-
cal analysis below we do not test for the causal direction,
we remain agnostic about the direction and simply posit a
positive relationship between depth and flexibility:
Hypothesis 1: The deeper a PTA, the more flexible it is.
For two reasons, we expect that the conventional wis-
dom that motivates Hypothesis 1 needs to be qualified.
First, regime type conditions the relationship between
depth and flexibility, because democracies rely more
strongly on nontariff barriers and trade remedies for pro-
tection than nondemocracies (Kono 2006:374). In
democracies, voters punish politicians that impose high
tariffs, which is a transparent tax on consumers. So that
they still can satisfy interest groups that demand protec-
tion, democratic governments rely on devices about
which voters have little information, namely nontariff bar-
riers and trade remedies.
For the design of PTAs, this “optimal obfuscation”
argument implies that democracies will include flexibility
provisions even in shallow agreements, as they need them
to respond to protectionist demands in a manner that
avoids punishment by voters. In the absence of flexibility,
they would be in breach of the agreement when, for
example, imposing antidumping or countervailing duties.
Nondemocracies, by contrast, see little advantage from
flexibility in shallow agreements. By definition, a shallow
agreement does not hinder them selectively to use trade
barriers to placate import-competitors, and they do not
need flexibility provisions for that purpose as they have
no incentive to disguise their reliance on protectionism
for reasons related to voters’ concerns.
As depth increases, we expect to see only a small
increase in flexibility for democracies, which already
include much flexibility in shallow agreements. The cau-
sal argument presented above about the relationship
between depth and flexibility thus should mainly apply to
nondemocracies. They see their ability to respond to pro-
tectionist demands via traditional trade barriers restricted
in deep agreements and then add flexibility provisions to
deep agreements that satisfy import-competing interests.
Table 1 summarizes this argument. Importantly, we only
expect regime type to condition the relationship between
depth and flexibility for classical escape instruments. For
flexibility measures related to tariffs (such as tariff cut
phase-ins, as discussed below), we do not expect such a
conditional relationship. Even if democracies rely less on
tariffs for protectionist purposes, they have little to gain
from a very rapid reduction of existing tariff rates. We
thus hypothesize:
Hypothesis 2: The positive relationship between depth and flexi-
bility is weaker for democracies than for nondemocracies.
Second, when governments add more flexibility to deep
agreements, they likely attach strings to the use of these
additional flexibility provisions. The causal logic underly-
ing this qualification starts with the insight that flexibility
poses risks for both governments and exporters alike.
Countries may use flexibility to ease adjustment costs and
thus reduce temporarily high costs of compliance. As this
ensures the long-term viability of cooperation, this is the
intended use of flexibility. Some countries, however, may
abuse flexibility provisions that offer them some discre-
tion to impose temporary trade barriers with the aim of
giving rents to particular domestic constituencies. Overuse
of the opt-outs, in turn, jeopardizes the overall benefits of
the agreement (and its stability) in the long run. It may
even nullify the benefits of market access. Exporters that
value market access thus oppose lax rules on flexibility
which would allow foreign governments or importers to
demand too much protection (Kucik 2012:98).
With the aim of avoiding abuse of flexibility provisions
with a discretionary element, governments then have a
strong incentive ex-ante to define limits to the use of flex-
ibility instruments. They can be expected to agree on
procedural constraints to control the application of
escape tools as a sort of hand-tying approach. Various
possibilities exist for restricting the use of flexibility mea-
sures. In terms of safeguards and antidumping, states
may limit the duration of an antidumping duty, restrict
the upper level of the trade remedy imposed, or make
reference to the GATT/WTO legal framework that pre-
scribes a number of procedural and substantive obliga-
tions that shield against abuse. In the case of the South
Korea–US negotiations, for example, the Korean car
industry lobbied hard for changes in US trade remedy
laws that would make the imposition of antidumping
duties more difficult. As regards subsidies, treaties may
push governments to decrease or eliminate them or
demand active cooperation among authorities to address
competition-related negative spillovers. For instance, the
trade agreement between Japan and Switzerland foresees
that while parties to the agreement can maintain high
levels of domestic support, no export subsidies shall be
introduced or maintained on agricultural products for
which they agreed on tariff liberalization.4 We call these
measures “flexibility strings.”
4 In the WTO, export subsidies in agricultural products are generally still
allowed under specific conditions. The abolition of these subsidies forms part
of the single negotiation package in the context of the current negotiations
in the framework of the WTO.
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The second qualification of the conventional wisdom
that we derive from this reasoning is that countries will
attach strings to the use of flexibility provisions. Govern-
ments will seek an optimal degree of flexibility that allows
for temporary breach and adaptation if necessary, but
restrict this flexibility through a set of tools. We thus for-
mulate the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3: PTAs that are more flexible contain more flexibil-
ity strings.
Before empirically examining our hypotheses, we
address two potential objections to our argument. On
the one hand, some evidence suggests that governments
do not start from scratch in designing PTAs, but rely on
templates. Even if they do so, however, this should not
affect our analysis, as the PTA template likely includes
all of the aspects of the design of a PTA that we capture
in our hypotheses: depth, flexibility, and flexibility
strings. To the extent that copying takes place, we
expect governments to copy provisions from all three
areas, meaning that the postulated relationships should
remain intact.
On the other hand, our discussion so far has
ignored the fact that two or more countries contribute
to the design of a PTA. In a highly asymmetric rela-
tionship, the larger country (for example, the United
States) may not bother about including flexibility provi-
sions into a formally deep agreement, if the smaller
country (for example, Oman) does not pose a threat
for its import-competing sectors. The smaller country,
in turn, may not have the power to insist on the inclu-
sion of the flexibility provisions or to resist the imposi-
tion of flexibility strings. In such a case, the postulated
relationships between depth, flexibility, and flexibility
strings would disappear. We expect, however, that
import-competitors in a large country worry that the
agreement could set a precedent, and thus defend the
inclusion of flexibility provisions even in agreements
with smaller trading partners. Although we think that
power asymmetry should not affect our results, below
we carry out an empirical test that directly tackles this
issue.
Operationalization and Descriptive Evidence
For the empirical analysis of the relationship between
depth, flexibility, and flexibility strings, we rely on an ori-
ginal data set on the design of 587 PTAs signed between
1945 and 2009. The list of agreements contains 358 bilat-
eral and 229 plurilateral agreements and substantially
goes beyond the list of agreements registered with the
WTO (60% of them feature in the WTO list). It results
from the integration of several existing lists (including
those maintained by the Organization of American States’
Foreign Trade Information System and the World Bank)
and the systematic search of government web pages. The
average agreement in the data set is relatively young (no
fewer than 73% of the agreements have been signed
since 1990), was signed by developing countries (67% are
of a South–South type), and is a full free trade agreement
(60% of the data set).
We coded the agreements manually for a total of eight
market-access-related sectors of cooperation that may be
included in PTAs, encompassing goods, services, invest-
ments, intellectual property rights, competition, public
procurement, standards, and trade remedies. For each of
these sectors, we coded a significant number of items,
meaning that we have about 100 data points for each
agreement. To ensure the reliability of the data, we dou-
ble-coded all agreements and then resolved any differ-
ences between the two sets of data.5
For nearly all variables, inter-rater agreement as mea-
sured by Cohen’s kappa exceeds 0.75. Moreover, cross-
checks of the data set against existing ones that partially
overlap with it confirm the reliability of the data.6 The
large number of agreements coded and the level of detail
included in the coding mean that this data set offers a
unique opportunity to test our argument. In the follow-
ing, we discuss how we use this data set to measure
depth, flexibility, and flexibility strings.
We use two different measures of depth below. On the
one hand, we created an additive index of 48 items in
our data set (Depth (index)). We only included items in
the index that theoretically relate to depth and weighted
each item equally (the supplementary file available on
ScholarOne contains a list of all of these items). While
theoretically this measure can range from 0 to 48, in
practice, we observe values in the range from 0 to 40. On
the other hand, we relied on item response analysis on
the same set of variables to arrive at a measure of depth
(Depth (IR)). Latent trait analysis is a technique that
resembles factor analysis, with the advantage that it is
applicable to binary data (Bartholomew, Knott, and Mou-
staki 2011). The specific model that we apply, which is
known as the Rasch model, assumes that all items capture
one underlying latent dimension. The items, however,
contribute more or less to this latent dimension (that is,
they have more or less discriminatory power). Using this
operationalization, relatively rare provisions contribute
more to depth than ubiquitous provisions. After rescaling
to remove negative values, this variable ranges from 0 to
3.3.
The two measures are highly correlated (r = 0.94).
For both depth measures, we find that over time agree-
ments have become deeper, with the trend toward deep
agreements starting in the second half of the 1980s. We
also observe that North–South agreements are substan-
TABLE 1. Regime Type, Depth, and Flexibility
Shallow Deep
Democracies Need flexibility to respond to protectionist demands Need flexibility to respond to protectionist demands
Nondemocracies Less need for flexibility; protectionist demands are
satisfied with other trade barriers
Need for flexibility, as ability to use other measures constrained
5 For more details, see D€ur et al. (2014).
6 For these other data sets, see the contributions in Estevadeordal, Suomi-
nen, and Teh (2009), World Trade Organization (2011) and Kucik (2012).
Estevadeordal et al. (2009) include up to 70 agreements that also feature in
the present data set (varying depending on chapter). World Trade Organiza-
tion (2011) analyzes the contents of 96 agreements. Kucik (2012) coded 323
of the agreements contained in our data set.
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tially deeper than both North–North and South–South
agreements in our data set. North–North agreements
are only slightly deeper than South–South agreements.
The United States (for example, Australia–US and
Colombia–US), Japan (for example, Japan–Switzerland),
and the European Free Trade Association (for example,
European Free Trade Association–Colombia) signed the
deepest agreements in the data set. On both measures
of depth, 147 agreements score 0, including the African
Common Market and a large number of Arab agree-
ments. As these examples suggest, in contrast to Slapin
and Gray (2014), in our data set, depth and the number
of member states are not positively related.
We also rely on two measures of flexibility. On the one
hand, we use a simple additive index of the presence or
absence of four provisions in PTAs: a provision allowing
for the suspension of tariff cuts in the case of balance of
payments problems, a general safeguard provision, a pro-
vision allowing for the imposition of countervailing
duties, and a provision allowing for the imposition of
antidumping duties (Escape flexibility).7 In the absence of
these provisions, a country that suspends its tariff cuts or
imposes antidumping and countervailing duties for goods
covered by the agreement breaches the agreement.8
These four provisions thus serve as escape clauses. The
index can range from 0 to 4. In our data set, 73 agree-
ments score 0 and 260 agreements score 4 on this vari-
able. Over time, we see an increasing number of
agreements including several of these escape provisions.
On the other hand, PTAs may also introduce flexibility
by allowing member states to postpone tariff reductions
(Chase 2003:160–165). The more time states have to
achieve the agreed tariff cuts, the more flexibility exists
for import-competing groups to adjust to increased com-
petition. We thus use the maximum (across all tariff cate-
gories) number of years that countries have to achieve
the liberalization of tariffs envisaged in the agreement as
a second measure of flexibility (Transitional flexibility).
Phase-out periods for tariff liberalization range between
0 years (members liberalize all tariffs at the date of entry
into force of an agreement) and 25 years. We took the
median for the member countries of a PTA if the transi-
tion periods vary across countries.9 As this type of flexibil-
ity does not contain a discretionary element, it does not
require flexibility strings.
Following Hypothesis 1, flexibility should be positively
related to depth. To examine this proposition, we show
boxplots for Escape flexibility based on a recoded depth
variable that ranges from 0 (very shallow) to 4 (very
deep). The resulting graph (Figure 1) shows a strong
positive relationship between the two variables. It also
suggests that the relationship may not be linear, an issue
that we discuss below. In Figure 2, we show that the posi-
tive relationship between depth and flexibility also holds
for our second measure of flexibility (Transitional flexibil-
ity). Again, we see a positive relationship between the two
variables. As depth increases, transitional flexibility also
increases. The figure shows that US agreements are not
only deep, but several of them also feature very long tran-
sition periods. By contrast, the African Economic
Community (founded in 1991) is a stark outlier in the
sense that it is very shallow and has one of the longest
transition periods in the data set.
Hypothesis 2 suggests that regime type (Regime) condi-
tions the relationship between depth and flexibility. We
rely on the Polity IV data set to distinguish between
democracies and nondemocracies.10 In line with the
existing literature, we consider countries to be democra-
cies if they have a Polity score of 6 or higher (Marshall,
Robert Gurr, and Jaggers 2010; Poast and Urpelainen
2013).11 We use the smallest of the Polity scores for all
members as the value for the PTA, but we get the same
results if we use the mean. Of the 587 agreements in our
data set, democracies signed 285 (48.6%) of them (we
have missing values for 11 agreements). In a bivariate
analysis, we find support for the conjecture put forward
in Hypothesis 2. The mean value of Escape flexibility for
shallow agreements (a value of Depth (index) of 10 or less)
is 2.88 for democracies and only 1.95 for nondemocra-
cies. For deep agreements, the value increases to 3.57 for
democracies and to 3.64 for nondemocracies. Moving
from a shallow to a deep agreement hence matters much
more for nondemocracies than for democracies.
Finally, Hypothesis 3 refers to constraints on flexibility.
We operationalize this variable (Flexibility strings) using six
items that capture limits with respect to the imposition of
antidumping duties, the provision of subsidies, and the
use of the safeguard provisions.12 These capture provi-
sions that impose WTO rules on the use of the antidump-
ing instrument, the safeguard provision and the provision
of subsidies, stipulate that the safeguard provision is only
valid during the transition period, create a common pol-
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FIG 1. Depth versus Escape Flexibility
7 We also used item response analysis as described for depth above to
combine these four items into a weighted index. The resulting variable is
highly positively correlated with the additive index that we use (r = 0.90).
8 If an agreement is silent on the use of trade remedies, parties have a
legitimate expectation that these mechanisms are not used, as they run coun-
ter to the main objective of an international agreement that foresees trade lib-
eralization through tariff cuts.
9 This applies to 20% of agreements. If we take the mean or the mini-
mum value in these cases, we obtain similar results (available upon request).
10 Results do not change if we use other measures of democracy such as
that of Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland (2010).
11 Our results are not sensitive to this particular threshold. We obtain
similar results, which are available upon request, if we use 7 or 8 as the thresh-
old.
12 This variable partly overlaps with Kucik’s (2012) operationalization of
“rigidity.” We also consider rules concerning subsidies, however, and use refer-
ences to WTO rules as a shortcut to many of the constraints included in
Kucik’s measure.
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icy on subsidies, and define a minimum dumping margin
(the supplementary file contains more information on
these items). The variable potentially ranges from 0 to 6,
depending on the number of provisions included in a
trade agreement that restrict the imposition of antidump-
ing duties and the use of subsidies and the safeguard pro-
visions. In practice, the variable ranges from 0 (195
agreements) to 5 (4 agreements).13
Figure 3 offers a first test of our argument concerning
a relationship between flexibility and flexibility strings.
The relationship between the two variables is positive as
expected following Hypothesis 3. As escape flexibility
increases, countries make its use more difficult. The rela-
tionship is slightly nonlinear, however: At the maximum
of escape flexibility, flexibility strings are less pronounced
than when escape flexibility takes the value of three. As
can be seen in online appendix S1, this nonlinearity is
driven by a decline in the number of WTO restrictions
on safeguard provisions in highly flexible agreements.
This drop is due to European agreements that de facto
contain the same strings attached to the use of the safe-
guard clauses as the WTO, but without making an expli-
cit reference to the WTO. We address the issue of
nonlinearity in the robustness checks below.
Revisiting the Relationship between Depth and
Flexibility
Going beyond the descriptive evidence, we estimate multi-
variate regression models with flexibility and flexibility
strings as dependent variables. For two reasons, we
choose the PTA as the unit of analysis and thus con-
sciously depart from previous PTA research that mainly
used dyad-year (Mansfield and Milner 2012) or PTA-
country-year (Kucik 2012) as unit of analysis. First, the
design of a PTA does not vary across member countries
in our data set. By using dyad-year or PTA-country-year as
units of analysis, therefore, we would multiply the values
of our dependent variable in plurilateral agreements. Sec-
ond, with the exception of a small number of regional
agreements (in particular, the European Union), the
design of PTAs does not vary over time in our data set.
By dropping the time dimension, therefore, we do not
lose any information. In fact, using the PTA as the unit
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FIG 3. Escape Flexibility versus Flexibility Strings
13 Again, this variable is highly correlated with one that relies on item
response analysis (r = 0.99).
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of analysis is a conservative choice to avoid inflating the
number of observations and artificially reducing standard
errors.
Control Variables
In the following multivariate models, we include several
control variables that allow us to deal with potentially
confounding factors. Since our unit of analysis is the
PTA, we take the minimum value of each continuous vari-
able across member countries to capture the weakest
link.14 In terms of economic variables, we use (the natu-
ral log of) total GDP (GDP) and GDP per capita (GDPpc)
to capture the economic importance and income level of
a country. Countries with relatively large markets and rel-
atively rich countries may find it easier to design more
rigid agreements. Moreover, we include the minimum
value of trade flows (imports plus exports) among PTA
members (Trade). Here, the effect could go both ways:
More trade may mean that countries have an incentive to
design more rigid agreements, but it could also mean
that such PTAs have larger distributional effects, meaning
that countries require more flexibility. As is common
practice in the empirical trade literature, we take the log
of this value.
We also add a variable that captures whether a country
has recently undergone a transition from autocracy to
democracy (Democratization). The expectation is that
democratizing countries require more flexibility (and
fewer strings) since they face high levels of uncertainty
about future states of the world. This variable scores one
if all member countries of a PTA have transitioned to
democracy over the past ten years, with Polity IV as
indicator.
We also add a dummy that scores one if all PTA mem-
bers are also members of the WTO (WTO). WTO mem-
bers tend to implement trade policies that differ from
those of countries that are not members (Mansfield and
Reinhardt 2003:830). They also have discretionary flexi-
bility provisions upon which they can rely. We thus
expect WTO members to design more rigid agreements.
Finally, we include the number of member countries of a
PTA (No. Members), which previous research hypothesized
to be positively related to flexibility (Koremenos et al.
2001). Table 2 summarizes the descriptive statistics of the
dependent and independent variables.
Statistical Models
Since Escape flexibility and Flexibility strings are ordinal vari-
ables, we use ordered probit to estimate the models that
include them as dependent variables.15 We rely on zero-
inflated negative binomial regression in the equations
that have Transitional flexibility as dependent variable,
since this is a count variable with a large number of zeros
(about 50% of our observations score zero).16 This esti-
mation technique predicts first the existence of excess
zeros using a logistic regression and then predicts the
number of years until the end of the transition period
using a negative binomial estimation. We include the
same variables in the first and second stages.
Findings
Table 3 shows the results of the baseline models. In
models 1 and 2, we test Hypothesis 1 for both of our
measures of flexibility. In Model 3, we add an interac-
tion term between depth and regime type to test
Hypothesis 2. Models 4 and 5, finally, have Flexibility
strings as dependent variable, allowing us to test Hypoth-
esis 3. In the latter two models, we keep Depth as a con-
trol variable, to make sure that the distinction between
detailed and less detailed agreements does not drive our
results. In Model 5, we drop PTAs that have a value of
zero on Escape flexibility, since we cannot expect states to
include flexibility strings in agreements with no discre-
tionary flexibility.
Across all models, the findings conform to our expecta-
tions.17 Indeed, the coefficients of both Depth and Escape
Flexibility are positive and statistically significant at the
conventional level.18 Thus, deeper PTAs are more flexi-
ble. Similarly, more escape flexibility goes hand in hand
with a greater number of flexibility strings, even after
controlling for the depth of a PTA (Model 4). This latter
finding proves robust to dropping PTAs with no escape
flexibility (Model 5).
To assess whether regime type conditions the relation-
ship between depth and flexibility, Figures 4 and 5 show
the marginal effect of nondemocracy and democracy on
Escape flexibility for different values of Depth. We focus on
the probability of including no flexibility provisions (Fig-
ure 4) and including the maximum number of escape
clauses (Figure 5). The figures show, first, that for a given
level of Depth, democracies tend to sign more flexible
PTAs than nondemocracies. Second, and in line with our
second hypothesis, the effect of Depth on flexibility is lar-
ger for nondemocracies than for democracies. Figure 4
shows that as Depth increases, the probability of including
no flexibility into PTAs decreases substantially more for
nondemocracies than for democracies. Similarly, Figure 5
shows that as Depth increases, the probability of making a
TABLE 2. Descriptive Statistics
Variables Mean SD Min Max
Escape flexibility 2.68 1.46 0 4
Transitional flexibility 3.44 5.04 0 25
Flexibility strings 1.53 1.35 0 5
Depth 8.13 10.03 0 40
GDP 21.30 1.81 14.13 27.39
GDPpc 8.41 0.99 5.07 10.64
Trade 2.96 2.70 0 11.98
Regime 1.55 7.14 10 10
Regime dummy 0.49 0.50 0 1
Democratization 0.25 0.43 0 1
WTO 0.50 0.50 0 1
No. members 5.65 8.65 2 91
14 Our results are similar if we use the median or average across member
countries. Results are available upon request.
15 Results are similar if we use multinomial logistic regression (available
upon request).
16 The test of a shows that a negative binomial model is more appropriate
than a zero-inflated poisson model (except for Model A16). The Vuong test
shows that a zero-inflated negative binomial model outperforms an ordinary
negative binomial regression.
17 In all models, we lose some observations because some of our control
variables have incomplete coverage. Our results are not sensitive to dropping
control variables with missing observations.
18 For model 2, we only show the coefficients of the second equation. In
the first equation, as expected, Depth and Trade are negative predictors of the
probability of having zero tariff transition. The other variables are not statisti-
cally significant.
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PTA highly flexible increases substantially more for non-
democracies than for democracies (when moving from 0
to 20, we see an increase of 40% for nondemocracies and
20% for democracies). The positive correlation between
depth and flexibility thus hinges on domestic institutions,
as presented in Table 1.
In Table 4, we summarize the magnitude of the sub-
stantive effects of Model 1. Moving Depth from its mini-
mum to its maximum value increases by 63 [52, 71]% the
probability of having the highest value of Escape Flexibility,
that is, four. The results of Model 2 indicate that moving
Depth from its minimum to its maximum value increases
the tariff transition period by 8 [6, 10] years. The transi-
tion period increases by 3 [2, 4] years if Depth moves from
a standard deviation below the mean to a standard devia-
tion above the mean.
In Table 5, we summarize the magnitude of the sub-
stantive effects of Model 4. Moving Escape Flexibility from
its minimum to its maximum value decreases by 83 [89,
75]% the probability of having the lowest value of Flexi-
bility Strings, that is, zero. Similarly, moving Escape Flexibil-
ity from its minimum to its maximum value increases by
40 [34, 45]% the probability of observing a value of 3 on
Flexibility Strings.19
The results for the control variables also are largely in
line with our expectations. Large countries sign agree-
ments that contain more flexibility strings. Rich countries
have shorter transition periods than poor ones. Equally,
democratization correlates negatively and WTO member-
ship correlates positively with the number of flexibility
strings. Of the coefficients that are statistically significant,
only the negative sign for the coefficient for Democratiza-
tion in Model 2 is surprising. Contrary to our expectation,
democratizing countries sign agreements with a shorter
transition period. The reason here may be that these
countries use PTAs as a commitment device and thus
want these agreements to take effect as soon as possible
(Liu and Ornelas 2014). As expected, the effect of Trade
on flexibility is ambiguous. Paired with the descriptive evi-
dence provided above, these models thus offer encourag-
ing support for our hypotheses.
TABLE 3. Baseline Models
Covariates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Escape Transitional Escape Strings Strings
Depth 0.05*** 0.02*** 0.07*** 0.06*** 0.06***
(0.01) (0.003) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Escape Flexibility 0.71*** 0.73***
(0.05) (0.06)
Regime 0.04*** 0.01* 0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.007) (0.01) (0.01)
Regime Dummy 0.77***
(0.14)
Depth 9 Regime
GDP 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.17*** 0.16***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05)
GDPpc 0.06 0.17*** 0.05 0.04 0.002
(0.07) (0.05) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Trade 0.07** 0.06*** 0.07*** 0.05** 0.06**
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03)
Democratization 0.07 0.21** 0.06 0.28** 0.30***
(0.12) (0.11) (0.12) (0.13) (0.13)
WTO 0.04 0.10 0.04 0.40*** 0.44***
(0.11) (0.10) (0.11) (0.12) (0.12)
No. Members 0.0005 0.01 0.004 0.002 0.002
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Cut1 0.96 0.83 4.86*** 5.14***
(0.89) (0.88) (0.99) (1.03)
Cut2 0.42 0.29 5.71*** 6.00***
(0.89) (0.88) (1.00) (1.04)
Cut3 0.09 0.22 6.70*** 7.02***
(0.88) (0.88) (1.01) (1.05)
Cut4 0.61 0.74 8.32*** 8.63***
(0.89) (0.88) (1.02) (1.07)
Cut5 9.60*** 9.91***
(1.04) (1.09)
Constant 4.17***
(0.71)
Test of a 61.38***
Vuong test 9.04***
Nonzero Obs. 208
Zero Obs. 263
Pseudo R2 0.10 0.10 0.33 0.29
Observations 559 471 559 543 482
(Notes. Models 1, 2, 4, and 5 are ordered probit. Model 3 is a zero-inflated negative binomial model.
Standard errors in parentheses. ***p < .01, **p < .05, *p < .1).
19 In our data set, very few PTAs have values that are equal to 4 or 5.
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Robustness Checks
We perform several tests to check the robustness of our
findings. First, we replace the indicators of depth, escape
flexibility, and flexibility strings obtained by summing
provisions with the indicators of depth, escape flexibility,
and flexibility strings that rely on item response analysis
(see the discussion above). Doing so does not change our
results (see Table A1). Second, Figures 1 and 3 indicate
that the relationships between the relevant variables may
be nonlinear. To address this issue, we recode Depth so
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FIG 5. The Effect of Depth on the Probability of Escape Flexibility Equaling Four for Democracy and Autocracy
TABLE 4. Predictions for the Effect of Depth on Escape Flexibility
(Model 1)
Value Min ? Max CI
0 0.16 [0.20, 0.12]
1 0.16 [0.19, 0.12]
2 0.17 [0.22, 0.13]
3 0.14 [0.18, 0.10]
4 0.63 [0.52, 0.71]
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that it scores one for values between one and five, two for
values between six and ten, and so on. Then, we include
each value as a dummy on the right-hand side of a model
(leaving Depth=0 as baseline) in which Escape Flexibility is
the dependent variable. The model does indeed offer
some evidence of nonlinearity (Table A2). The effect of
very high values of Depth, namely between 36 and 40, is
lower than that of values of Depth between 31 and 35 (the
difference is statistically significant with p < .1). Neverthe-
less, and importantly, the effect of very deep agreements
remains positive, as expected in Hypothesis 1. Similarly,
we include dummies of each value of Escape Flexibility in a
model in which Flexibility Strings is the dependent vari-
able. The results show that the positive effect of Escape
Flexibility on Flexibility Strings is larger when Escape Flexibil-
ity is equal to three than when it is equal to two (the dif-
ference is statistically significant at p < .01). Again,
however, the model confirms our key expectation of a
positive relationship between Escape Flexibility and Flexibil-
ity Strings. We also exclude these PTAs that have a value
of zero in our Depth variable (147 observations in our
data set). Even in this case, the main results remain
unchanged (see models A8, A9, and A10 in the supple-
mentary file).
Third, as suggested above, power asymmetry could
affect the relationship between depth, flexibility, and flex-
ibility strings. If a large country such as the United States
does not fear competition from a small country, import-
competitors in the former only have weak incentives to
lobby for the inclusion of flexibility provisions in a PTA.
At the same time, the large country could impose flexibil-
ity strings on the small country. To test this counterargu-
ment, we split our sample into North–South PTAs, and
North–North and South–South PTAs. Should the afore-
mentioned objection hold, Depth should not be statisti-
cally significant in the subsample of North–South PTAs.
Table A3 in the supplementary file, however, shows that
this is not the case. Depth remains positive and statistically
significant in these models. In fact, we find no statistically
significant difference between the coefficients in the two
subsamples.
Fourth, we use Kucik’s (2012) data to operationalize
Escape flexibility and Flexibility strings and rerun our main
models. We rely on the same operationalization of Escape
flexibility as above; to measure Flexibility strings, we employ
Kucik’s (2012) measure of rigidity.20 Table A4 and
Figures A10 and A11 show that our main results hold
even using this different data set, which includes only
half the number of observations that we have in our data
set.
Finally, we include a variable counting the years since
the signing of the first PTA in our data set, that is, since
1948. This variable accounts for the possibility that a time
trend could drive our results, as both flexibility and
depth increase over time. It allays concerns that a third
variable, not included in our model, which also increases
over time, causes the growth in both depth and flexibility
that we capture. Table A5, however, shows that our main
results are unchanged even after including this trend
variable.21
Conclusion
Based on an original data set on the design of 587 PTAs,
we find that two qualifications apply to the conventional
understanding of the depth–flexibility nexus in the
design of international institutions. On the one hand,
while deep trade agreements tend to be more flexible
than shallow ones, this relationship proves less pro-
nounced for democracies than for nondemocracies. This
stems from how democracies rely more heavily on nontar-
iff barriers and other forms of contingent protection,
such as trade remedies, than do autocracies (Kono 2006).
On the other hand, while deep PTAs offer more flexibil-
ity, states restrict the additional, discretionary flexibility
with relevant strings.
This article speaks to the literature on PTAs (Manger
2009; Baccini and D€ur 2012; Mansfield and Milner 2012).
The quantitative PTA literature tended to treat all PTAs
as equivalent, but recent studies have started to pay atten-
tion to the diversity of the design of such agreements.
Explaining this variation should help to elucidate the rea-
sons that regimes sign PTAs, as states’ motivations to
form PTAs may also affect the design of PTAs. Our find-
ings regarding the relationship between depth and flexi-
bility also indicate the need for caution in research on
the consequences of PTAs. Such research needs to take
into consideration the effects of both of these dimensions
of PTA design.
Our findings also contribute in several important ways
to the literature on the design of international institu-
tions (for example, Koremenos et al. 2001). First, our
analysis shows that earlier work overly simplifies the
determinants of institutional design. Domestic institu-
tions play an important, but so far overlooked, role in
conditioning the relationship between different dimen-
sions of the design of international treaties. Second, we
introduce the concept of flexibility strings to illustrate
how governments can deal with time inconsistency prob-
lems. Governments have strong incentives to ensure that
flexibility avoids threatening the stability of deep agree-
ments. Flexibility strings allow countries to maintain pre-
dictability even when engaging in deep cooperation.
Finally, we add an analysis of PTAs to the literature on
the design of international institutions that so far has
mainly focused on a few prominent international organi-
zations (but see Baccini 2010; Kucik 2012). Our empiri-
cal focus provides an important analytical advantage: In
the negotiations on PTAs, all aspects of design are up
for discussion. This makes PTAs a particularly interesting
case for understanding the interrelation of different
dimensions of design.
TABLE 5. Predictions for the Effect of Escape Flexibility on Flexibility
Strings (Model 4)
Value Min ? Max CI
0 0.83 [0.89, 0.75]
1 0.06 [0.01, 0.10]
2 0.34 [0.28, 0.39]
3 0.40 [0.34, 0.45]
4 0.04 [0.02, 0.06]
5 0.002 [0.0002, 0.01]
20 Since this measure of Flexibility strings ranges from 0 to 15, we estimate
the model relying on ordinary least squares regression. The results are similar
if we use an ordered probit model.
21 The results are similar if we include the square and cube of the time-
trend variable (Carter and Signorino 2010). Since the three variables are
highly correlated (q > .95), we prefer to include only one time-trend variable.
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In view of the negotiations for mega PTAs such as the
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the Trans-Atlantic
Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), this article
also has important real-world implications. It shows that
governments can find a balance between depth and flexi-
bility that addresses the concerns of diverse sets of
domestic actors. Increasingly, deep agreements, however,
require ever greater attention to the fine-tuning of other
aspects of institutional design, explaining why the negoti-
ations for new PTAs drag on for so long. Our study also
suggests that copying provisions from existing agreements
and then presenting them to stakeholders is a tricky exer-
cise for negotiators due to the interdependence between
the various dimensions of a treaty, which we have high-
lighted in this article. Designing an international institu-
tion is thus an even more complex task than previously
acknowledged.
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